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ON THE CRAFT AND PHILOSOPHY 
OF JUDGING 
James L .. Oakes* 
THE WAYS OF A JUDGE: REFLECTIONS FROM THE FEDERAL AP-
PELLATE BENCH. BY Frank M. Coffin. Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Co. 1980. Pp. xiv, 273. $10.95. 
It takes someone like Frank Coffin, who has served in all three 
branches of government, to put the appellate process in its proper 
perspective. A former Congressman from Maine and a foreign aid 
administrator, a long-time United States Circuit Judge, and now 
Chief Judge of the First Circuit, he has written The Ways of a Judge 
to shed light on the subject of judging - particularly federal appel-
late judging - for nonjudges, laymen and lawyers alike, for law stu-
dents, and for those in journalism or politics. The book's success in 
achieving its purpose makes it must reading for lawyers and law stu-
dents. One can only hope that iJ is also read by others who, in an 
increasingly litigious world, should be concerned •with how the 
courts of last resort for almost all federal and state cases operate, as 
well as with how the judges of those courts deliberate and decide 
everything from ordinary criminal and civil cases to the far-reaching 
public-interest, institutional, and social-reform cases at the cutting 
edge of today's urban, bureaucratized, and pluralistic society. 
In summarizing the book, this Review will examine some of the 
similarities and differences between Chief Judge Coffin's and the re-
viewer's courts and between their respective approaches to the judi-
cial process. The Review will conclude with a few comments on the 
philosophy of judging that Judge Coffin reveals in his somewhat sol-
emn, northern New England eloquence. 
The Ways of a Judge commences by recognizing the importance, 
even granting its invisibility to the public, of the appellate judge's 
role. Lacking the influence of the legislator or the executive branch's 
"levers of power'' (p. 7), the appellate judge is "a media cipher'' (p. 
7), isolated by a code of ethics "more stringent than that imposed on 
or accepted by any other group of public servants" (p. 8), but with a 
* Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. - Ed. 
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life tenure that is at once the pillar of judicial independence1 and the 
envy of Congress. Judge Coffin notes the judge's personal involve-
ment, the vexing and stimulating "professional-plus-philosophic" (p. 
9) challenge of the job, and the constraining but mind-opening disci-
pline of judging. And he makes short shrift of the politicians' old 
saw that judges should not "make" law by referring to the gaps left 
in nearly every legislative enactment. In doing so, he is rather kind 
to the legislatures, particularly Congress. He attributes the gaps to 
their inability to "foresee every problem" (p. 10), rather than to com-
promises knowingly made to transfer to the courts some of the politi-
cally hot·issues of the moment.2 
In the course of chapters on "The Appellate Idea in History" (pp. 
16-31) and "The Appellate Idea in the United States" (pp. 32-50), 
Judge Coffin makes a point that is too readily overlooked by critics 
of the courts: Our present system, encompassing state and federal 
courts, "represents an achievement . . . that has no equal today or in 
ages past in terms of utility and breadth ofreview, accessibility to the 
populace, and structure of deliberation" (p. 31 ). 
Only as one approaches the center of the book does one learn the 
"ways" of a judge. Before moving into the judge's chambers, the 
author outlines several of "The Elements of Deciding Appeals" (pp. 
51-63), which distinguish appellate review from other types of deci-
sion-making. A primary constraint on judicial decision-making, of 
course, is its tradition of independence and objectivity. This tradi-
tion and other aspects of the appellate process substantially shape 
the judge's task. Appeals involve focused review of some decision 
made below, and appellate judges must rely on structured (written 
and oral) arguments by adversaries. Various constraints and convic-
tions limit their freedom to decide but an area of challenge is always 
left open. The constraints include that of writing in the sense that 
drafting an opinion makes a judge think, something that I fear is all 
too often lost in a day of summary judgments, affirmances from the 
bench, "screening" by staff clerks and the like, all of which strain the 
quality of justice. Judge Coffin mentions also the constraint of "col-
legiality," or having to decide by panel, by committee so to speak, 
while nevertheless respecting the autonomy of each individual - an 
autonomy that may be preserved primarily by the bu.ff ers of time 
within which to decide3 and the distance between the scattered 
1. I may say that it is an independence that nevertheless has its own threats. See Kauf-
man, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 YALE L.J. 681 (1979), 
2. See Johnson, The Alabama Punting Syndrome, JUDGES' J., Spring 1979, at 4, 53-54. 
3. But see notes 12-13 infra and accompanying text. 
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chambers of a judicial circuit.4 He concludes with the perceptive ob-
servation that decision-making occurs incrementally, and is "en-
hanced by prolonged indecisiveness" (p. 61 ). It constitutes, in effect, 
"a series of shifting biases" (p. 63), comparable to a series of turns in 
a road. 
"Work Ways" is a lovely part of the book. It describes the 
"chambers community" (pp. 67-74), the relationship of staff and law 
clerks to judge, one which I suspect is different with each and every 
judge but one which - as Frank Coffin describes his own chambers 
- is very close to my own. Ideally, it results in a mutual learning 
and sharing experience with the buck ultimately stopping at the 
judge's desk (or occasionally in his wastebasket). The ultimate de-
termination is his to make, but with substantial input at various 
stages of argumentation by memoranda and by conversation, by ed-
iting and occasional drafting. Judge Coffin's phrase, and I cannot 
improve upon it, is "creative collaboration" (p. 71 ). Every potential 
law clerk should read this chapter. Judge Coffin writes also of Bailey 
Aldrich's ''windowsill workload" - the unseen work including pro 
se complaints, rehearing petitions, procedural applications, habeas 
petitions, and emergency requests (pp. 75-78) - and of the cycle of a 
judge's work, monthly in the First and Second Circuits from Sep-
tember through June with some time free in August, or maybe a 
week in the dea4 of winter. The "cycle" Judge Coffin calls it (p. 78); 
a "pipeline" is my word for it. One must read the briefs, read the 
law clerks' memos, hear the arguments, exchange memoranda, con-
fer, write an opinion, ask one's law clerks to edit it, obtain one's col-
leagues' suggestions or dissents, rewrite, rethink, and file it, consider 
the inevitable petition for rehearing, keep one's sense of humor when 
someone asks for an en bane vote or the Supreme Court grants certi-
orari, and :finally, study the long-delayed law review comments, 
often reeking of the lamp, but sometimes surgically penetrating. It is 
a "cycle," a "pipeline," truly to be cherished by anyone interested in 
intellectual challenge, with an inspirational sense of political-social-
historical American values, aims, and aspirations, but also with a 
deep moderating sense of the constraints oflogic, intellectual candor, 
practicality, and the evolutionary process of law. 
"Preparing for Argument" (pp. 81-108) discusses more specifi-
4. The Seventh Circuit is the only one, so far as I know, in which all the judges live in and· 
work at the same place. This may have some advantages in efficiency; it may even inspire 
collegiality. But I think it would tend to narrow one's perspective to live and work constantly 
in one metropolitan area with its media and atmosphere. To me, there is a healthy regional 
mix of viewpoints that occurs when some of the judges come from other, sometimes distant 
places. 
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cally the clerk-judge relationship. Rather than use law clerk bench 
memos (which I for one find handy for postargument discussion and 
for writing interjudge voting memoranda) Judge Coffin prefers to 
discuss the cases back and forth, taking notes, after evening (some of 
us do it on weekends) brief reading. Going through the briefs can be 
the most tedious and discomfiting part of the judge's job; tedious if a 
case is frivolous, discomfiting if it does not admit of ready decision-
making. Judge Coffin mentions the "sheer quantity" (p. 83) of mate-
rial to be read, 2000 pages or so of briefs per one-week sitting,5 ex-
clusive of appendices, records, transcripts, and the like. As I do, or 
have to, Judge Coffin in effect speed-reads the briefs, reading closely 
the simpler cases, getting a general grasp of the more complicated 
ones, knowing when and where further exploration is needed, and 
sensing the key case where a novel issue is present and "basic values 
may determine the outcome" (p. 84). And he mentions, enlighten-
ingly for the nonjudge, perhaps, that the judge thinks of questions he 
can ask that ''will make his colleagues think."6 
In what some will find as the most interesting part of the book, 
Judge Coffin then discusses three typical cases - two with parties' 
and counsels' names changed, one with real names since its facts are 
-well-known.7 He describes how each was handled by judge and 
staff, summarizes the argument, and relates the outcome. The first is 
a drug-smuggling case with a typical search and seizure question and 
. several run-of-the-mill subsidiary issues (except for a definition of 
smuggling in an 1899 Supreme Court case),8 including the factual 
sufficiency of the evidence question. The second is a highly technical 
federal consumer protection case, with over-long briefs and a 
tweleve-volume record. We call these kinds of cases "blockbusters," 
and give them a weight of ten on a calendar-weighing scale from one 
to ten that our calendar clerks use to even out weekly assignments. 
And the third, nonfictional case, ultimately reversed by the Supreme 
Court, was a prisoner's civil rights ~ase involving procedural due 
process when transfers to maximum security institutions are made. 
After describing the facts of each case, but before discussing the 
arguments, Judge Coffin lists a few general concerns that recur in 
cases regularly. The list includes (1) identifying threshold issues of 
5. This number seems high to me on average, but perhaps the First Circuit hears more 
cases per sitting - Judge Coffin mentions thirty - and has fewer sittings per judge. 
6. P. 84. This is not said deprecatingly of one's fellow judges by Judge Coffin or me; they 
are hopefully doing the same thing. 
7. Fano v. Meachum, 520 F.2d 374 (1st Cir. 1975), revtl., 427 U.S. 215 (1976). 
8. Keck v. United States, 172 U.S. 434 (1899). 
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jurisdiction and procedure - including appellate jurisdiction, moot-
ness, abstention, and standard of review; (2) understanding the facts, 
the arguments made, and the opinion below, which involves reading 
within a rationed time-frame, seminar-type discussion with the law 
clerks, and familiarizing oneself with applicable prior case law; 
(3) scenting weaknesses, "signs of rot" (p. 103) - ploys and critical 
omissions of fact, an issue overlooked, a leading case not referred to; 
(4) iI!-quiring after the common sense of the situation and determin-
ing the underlying policy at stake; (5) determining the best approach 
to handling the case - narrowly or broadly, by memorandum or 
full-scale opinion; and (6) identifying the last-minute points that the 
law clerks should examine before argument. Judge Coffin candidly 
says that while he could spend a solid month preparing for thirty 
cases, he actually spends fifteen to twenty hours. I think that a fair 
estimate of my own time for an equivalent amount of work, but to 
do the work within that time does require an ability to speed-read 
coupled with a variety of legal experiences, a keen nose for separat-
ing substance from form, and a willingness to keep one's mind to-
tally open on a fair number of issues that need further, deeper 
exploration in a key five or six of the week's cases. 
Chapter Seven deals with "A Term of Court't (pp. 109-42), or 
more properly, what happens at oral argument. When the judge has 
really probed the facts and law, the argument can be a crucible, 
though more frequently it produces only "modest dividends" (p. 
110). The interaction between court and counsel may even be of 
lesser importance than the interaction between judge and judge. The 
conference begins at argument.9 While the First Circuit confers at 
the end of each argument day, when the Second confers depends on 
the judges sitting and whether they exchange voting memoranda. 
Such an exchange was made in all cases in the days of the Learned 
Hand court, when the briefs were not read until after argument; 
indeed, the conference was usually held the Friday of the week fol-
lowing argument. Today, the Second Circuit often holds daily con-
ferences because crowded dockets, judgeship vacancies, and the 
complicated schedules of the senior, visiting, and district judges who 
regularly and often sit on appeal leave us no other choice. Accord-
ing to Judge Coffin, the First Circuit confers - somewhat like a 
Quaker meeting - after recess and a possible double-check with the 
law clerks. Conference can change views, send thoughts "packing." 
Argument itself in the First Circuit for a given side of a case is 
9. See note 6 supra. 
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twenty or thirty minutes, as it used to be in the Second. Now fifteen 
or even ten minutes is usual in our court, twenty the exception, and 
thirty only in the infrequent "blockbuster" case and often not then. 
The reader will surely enjoy, and I will not attempt to summarize, 
Judge Coffin's summary of the arguments and discussion of the law-
yers' strategies, as well as a synopsis of the judges' conference, in his 
three paradigm cases. I will, however, refer to his views of advocacy, 
which he likens to those of a fish on the art of fly-casting. These 
include, as keys, the lawyer's ability to sense the level of detail and 
sophistication expected of him, which in tum depends on the extent 
to which the judge has explored the issues in the case before argu-
ment; a "controlled flexibility" (p. 131) allowing the lawyer to an-
swer the judge's questions - now, not later, I would add - while 
keeping his engine in gear; a sense of the policies with which the 
judge is concerned; a "disciplined earnestness" (p. 132) that conveys 
a sense of conviction without making every point a matter of life and 
death; and the inevitable "instinct for the jugular" (p. 133), which 
involves both going after the opponent's weakness, and sensing one's 
own and counteracting it. 
Judge Coffin seeks to answer the "bottom-line" question almost 
inevitably asked by students: When does argument matter? The 
times when argument changes the views of the court are few, less 
than ten percent, perhaps closer to five, I would agree. But a good 
argument ensures that a good case will not be lost, just as a "submis-
sion" by the appellant helps to ensure an affirmance. And a good 
argument can help shape (p. 135) the ultimate approach of the court. 
Judge Coffin's views on the judges' conference should be read by 
all judges. The ad hominem remarks, the not altogether judicial 
statements he uses as examples, will ring, I fear, on familiar ears. He 
enjoys as I do the constructive debate viewing all the possible dispo-
sitions and options, the fascinating "chemistry" that is involved, and 
the "simmering" exchange (p. 139). And he mentions the assign-
ment of opinions, a matter with which law clerks seem to be much 
concerned. The First, like the Second Circuit, leaves it to the presid-
ing judge to make the ultimate decision. But what presiding judge 
would not assign the workload equally, taking the toughest cases for 
himself (but not always), leaving the "glory" or some of it to others, 
giving the "seniors" and the "visitors" a break perhaps, leaving (or 
taking) the writing of a case when it is obvious that there is an even 
split to the "swing vote"? Dissatisfaction can arise, of course (Judge 
Coffin does not mention it), when the presiding judge either sloughs 
off the tougher, less glamorous cases or takes the "big" cases for him-
March 1982] Judging 585 
self. But human beings, are, after all, only human. So what is new 
under the sun? 
"The Creation of Opinions" (pp. 143-70) is an apt chapter title. 
By now it should be obvious that opinions are made, not born, in a 
judge's mind. All of the input - briefs, law clerks, research, argu-
ment, conferences, outside reading, 10 life experience, law compre-
hension - is mustered for a creation, an ultimate effort that is both 
physical and psychic, as Judge Coffin puts it so well. One does not 
write, one creates - the most satisfying part of the judge's job - but 
the creation is by no means solely of the artist. I am sure the process 
is not dissimilar to the remarks made about certain sixteenth, seven-
teenth, and eighteenth century artists - "from the school of," "at-
tributed to." An opinion in Judge Coffin's chambers, as in mine, is 
not the sole creation of the judge. It has prewriting input, postdraft 
and post-circulation input, as well as, sometimes, a long-delayed re-
view in the law reviews, which may be reflected in a later opinion on 
the same subject-matter. I confess to the same "feelings of chronic 
ineptitude and perennial uncertainty" (p. 144). To the judge who 
does not have them, I say, "BEWARE!" Such a judge is fooling only 
himself. This is not to say that the judge should let himself always 
be open to persuasion. There is a time-a time of decision, of cast-
ing the die - when one senses the hidden, inner "feel" of a case, the 
result that makes justice for the parties, keeps the "law" in tune with 
advancing times, constitutes a "creation," yes, but is, one hopes, 
based on precedent, reason, logic, philosophy, experience, common 
sense, ethics, history, social value. It is humbling for all of us lower 
court judges to know that such opinions are still subject to reversal. 
It keeps us not only honest, but when reversal occurs, also bemused, 
and serves as an ever-moderating factor to those who would un-
abashedly practice 'judicial activism." 11 
"The Workings of Collegiality" (pp. 171-92) describes, of course, 
the inner workings of an appellate court, its "institutional grouping" 
(p. 171), the relationship among the judges that Judge Coffin quite 
properly finds unique. Regardless of a circuit's size - the First Cir-
cuit is the smallest, the Second is of medium size - federal appellate 
10. I believe it imperative that a judge keep abreast of the day's news: social, cultural and 
economic trends, scientific and environmental affairs, in addition to the general legal develop-
ments occurring in the Supreme Court, one's own court, and elsewhere. I would conserva-
tively estimate that doing this involves 30-35 hours a week on top of the regular workload. 
And one still must read a little biography, history, philosophy on the subject of one's choice -
my favorite light reading remains famous trials of the past, just as that of my former -boss 
(Judge Harris B. Chase) was contemporary detective stories. 
11. See generally Ginsburg, Inviting Judicial Activism: A "Liberal" or "Conservative" Tech-
nique?, 15 GA. L. REV. 539 (1981). 
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judges share intimacy, deep if selective knowledge of one another, 
conduct characterized for the most part by openness and forgiveness, 
having no favors asked or given in the judicial context (though fre-
quently given in the personal one), criticism, response, and resolu-
tion. If there are lapses of civility, these are usually mended at the 
occasional get-togethers that take place at various intra-court func-
tions, as when a colleague is feted, a senior has a significant birthday 
or the like. I agree with Judge Coffin that "anticipatory collegiality" 
(p. 181) - that based on foreknowledge of the other's sensibilities -
is the most significant because it enables one to meet the other's ar-
guments, use words or phrases that do not grate raw skin, and call 
attention to the areas that one knows will arouse the particular col-
league's interest. "Responsive collegiality" (p. 183) he describes as 
the give-and-take that occurs after an opinion is circulated. The re-
actions that he mentions are most accurate: the phrasing of the an-
swering memo, the need to submit not just criticism but substitute 
wording, concern for the feelings of the opinion writer, care to avoid 
"a posture of either haughty rejection or servile acceptance" (p. 184), 
and the ultimate attempt at quality. 
Judge Coffin's "simultaneous collegiality" (p. 186), the emer-
gency hearing, often involving matters of moment, really struck a 
chord with me: I remember the Kennecott-Curtiss-Wright proxy 
battle, whose appeal the late Murray Gurfein and I received at 5:30 
P.M. the night before the 10:00 A.M. stockholder meeting (we 
worked out our decision about 9:40 A.M., staying the district judge's 
order denying Curtiss-Wright the right to vote); 12 the Norton-Simon 
tender offer for Avis expiring at 6:00 P.M., whose appeal I received 
at about 2:30 that afternoon and alone in the courthouse contacted 
my Vermont senior colleague, Sterry Waterman, just flown in and 
staying at the Yale Club (we heard the appeal at 4:00 or 4:30 P.M. 
and affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction against the 
tender offer about forty-five minutes later).13 Of such decisions - a 
third judge was not immediately available in either case - is "simul-
taneous collegiality" made. It helps, I would add, if the colleague is 
as close a friend and skillful a judge as were, in my cases, both Mur-
ray and Sterry. "Our court" can hear cases of considerable import 
12. The stay ultimately proved sound, since the judgment below was reversed by a unani-
mous panel. See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 
1978). 
13. No appeal was taken. The case is captioned in our court as Miller v. Avis, Inc., 573 
F.2d 1293 (2d Cir. 1977) (declining to stay the denial of a preliminary injunction sought by a 
dissident stockholders' group). 
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on a moment's notice and decide them. I have no regrets or com-
punctions about either decision. 
Judge Coffin writes also of "collegial governance" (p. 188)- the 
oversight role of the Judicial Council, 14 standing committees, proce-
dures for hearing complaints about judges (established by the Con-
gress over the wise objection of a few judges like my former Chief, 
Irving Kaufman), 15 the Administrative Office, the Federal Judicial 
Center, the National Judicial Conference. These well-intended and 
extremely hard working organizations, alas, sometimes divert the 
minds of the judges, Frank Coffin points out, to "the performance of 
tasks bearing only a remote relationship to the judging process" (p. 
191). Here I quote the judge directly because my thoughts almost 
exactly echo his: 
My instinct for survival, admittedly far easier to apply in the small-
est of the circuits, is to think small, to be skeptical of proposals that 
require added staff, meetings, or reports, to resist forming permanent 
committees, to suspend judgment on much of the sophisticated tech-
nology designed to spare us from our labors. I do not say that my 
mind is closed; only that I am increasingly concerned that the devices 
of technology and the systems of modem management which are in-
voked to solve the problems of quantity and expedition may divert our 
energies from the goal of the highest quality of justice. [P. 192.] 
There is more to judging, surely, than mere bureaucratic 
management. 
I do, however, take exception to his views on technology. I find 
word-processing and inter-office electronic/telephonic communica-
tion extremely valuable tools in dealing with the surge of business 
that we have in a day of breakdown in what used to be taken for 
granted - transportation, rail or air, postal service, and the like. 
The combination of "Ma Bell" and Lanier or Wang helps to make 
up for the demise of the New York Central, Northeast Airlines, Air 
New England, the deterioration of the Lexington Avenue I.R.T., and 
the rising price of gasoline. Recently, for example, at a "split sit-
ting," one extending over a weekend, I dictated voting memoranda 
from New York to my secretary in Vermont, who put them on the 
word processor and telephonically transmitted them to a fellow 
judge's word processor back in New York. (I dare not claim that this 
substitutes for a real live secretary in New York or I would never be 
able to insist that my Vermont secretaries leave the state.) 
The final fifty pages of Judge Coffin's book are devoted to 
14. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 332(a)(l)(C) (Supp. 1981). 
15. See note 1 supra. 
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"Thought Ways" (pp. 195-249), and sketch the outlines of the judge's 
own judicial philosophy. Using Learned Hand's phrase, he notes 
first that we judges are 'jobbists" (p. 196), practitioners of a craft, 
with disciplines of the guild, and as such ( on the appellate level at 
least) are able to decide many if not most of the cases presented to us 
with only those disciplines, including precedent, the "rules" of statu-
tory construction, trial court discretion, and the like. He notes the 
different roles of the judge in a municipal or local court, who makes 
and communicates one-to-one judgments about people, and the 
judge at the trial level, who is simultaneously "administrator, man-
ager, diplomat, psychiatrist, and public relations expert"16 and is 
under greater pressures from time to time. 
But since by no means all cases are, or can be, decided with just 
the tools of the craft, the appellate judge is also an interpreter of 
values. Judge Coffin condemns the pigeonholing of judges that so 
often takes place in editorial columns, the halls of Congress, or, he 
could have added, in the mind of the public generally: "strict" or 
"loose" constructionist, "conservative" or "liberal," favoring "re-
straint" or "activism" (p. 200). Quite correctly he observes that 
while labels may be appropriate to some judges on some issues some 
of the time, labels also more often end rather than encourage 
thought. 
He goes on to note that judges, like everyone else, have moral 
values that generate immediate responses to certain stimuli, but sug-
gests that identification and consequent excision of these values with 
self-conscious analysis is surely necessary. In this regard, he points 
to the salutary "disinfectant" (p. 202) of writing down reasons for a 
decision - a reminder that summary dispositions can sometimes 
conceal bias of the worst type. Of a second set of values, those deriv-
ing from the social, economic, and political background of the judge, 
Judge Coffin is equally wary- the former plaintiffs' or defendants' 
lawyer in a personal injury case, the regulator in an enforcement 
agency case, and the like. Knowing the enemy, oneself, and being 
on guard is enough, he says. The third set of values, which he calls 
neutral in content, he divides into the two camps of Process and Sub-
stance: One reasonable judge might resolve the inevitable conflict 
between the two one way, deferring, say, to an expert agency, while 
another judge might resolve it in the opposite way, substantively ad-
vancing the rights of a group of individuals hurt by the agency's ac-
16. P. 198. Because the author touches so little on the work of nonappellate judges I rather 
wish that he had edited out this reference, though I do not disagree with its accuracy, only its 
generality. 
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tions. Judge Coffin concludes that these often unspoken values 
permit judges to reach most decisions without going into jurispru-
dential or moral philosophy (pp. 204-05). 
But then in a chapter entitled "Loss of Innocence and the Quest 
for Legitimacy" (pp. 206-14) he reviews for the layman the schools 
of legal thought from natural law found "mystically" to contain per-
manent truths; through Holmes's and Thayer's teaching of deference 
to legislatures; to Pound's, Brandeis's and Frankfurter's sociological 
jurisprudence; thence after to Judge Jerome Frank and the psycho-
logically oriented "Legal Realists"; and finally to the "Legal Pro-
cess" School, which emphasizes institutional constraints. Felix 
Frankfurter, Learned Hand, Herbert Wechsler, and Alexander Bick-
el, with their "neutral principles" and "passive virtues," are the fore-
most exponents of this last school, which Judge Coffin calls the 
"dominant" school of Americanjurisprudence. 17 He saves the con-
temporary "rights" thinking of Rawls and Dworkin for subsequent 
treatment under the rubric "moral philosophy." 
In the penultimate chapter, "Time for Reappraisal" (pp. 215-30), 
he develops his own thesis that the. various theories founded upon 
the presumption that judges are too undemocratic - too strident, 
simplistic, and absolutist. 18 He reminds us, as I have done else-
where, 19 and as Eugene Rostow did so well20 before any of us, that 
'judges are today subject to a relatively high degree of accountabil-
ity, not notably less effective than that to which officials in the other 
branches are realistically subject" (p. 219). "Judicial restraint" is 
not, after all, free from value judgments, as the highly charged cases 
of the last two decades demonstrate. 21 And three decades of change 
have resulted, he points out, in a citizenry more dependent on itself 
and bureaucratic institutions, in a shift of society's priorities toward 
liberty, privacy and fairness. We are now a 'justice-oriented soci-
ety" (p. 222) and as such we have seen enormous changes in the 
nature of litigation: class actions involving extra judicial institutions; 
a civil rights revolution; enlargement of criminals' civil liberties. 
17. P. 214. I question how "dominant" the "Legal Process" school is. The grounds of 
jurisprudential debate have largely shifted, it seems to me, to the battle between H.L.A. Hart's 
positivism on the one hand and the moral rights theories of Rawls and Dworkin on the other. 
See, e.g., Jurisprudence Symposium, 11 GA. L. REV. 969 (1977). 
18. I agree. See Oakes, The Proper Role of the Federal Courts in Enforcing the Bill of 
Rights, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 946-49 (1979) (James Madison Lecture). 
19. Id. 
20. Rostow, The .Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1952). 
See C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT (1960); R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERI-
OUSLY 142-44 (1977); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§§ 1-7 to 1-9 (1978). 
21. See Oakes, supra note 18, at 930-31. 
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This litigation, an engine of structural change with its broad-scale 
remedies, has now become the focus for much sophisticated debate. 
Judge Coffin foresees an increase in these trends as the population 
presses against limitations of resources, energy, and space, and as 
more and more people demand a justice-determined distribution of 
goods and resources. 
Judge Coffin's final chapter is "A Judge Seeks His Bearings" (pp. 
231-49). I believe he has found his, as much as any mere human 
being on a complicated sea can ever find them. He examines various 
clusters of closely related rights and discovers a wide disparity in 
their treatment. He finds both equal protection analysis and due 
process scrutiny chaotic. He uses his own Fano v. Meachum 22 toil-
lustrate this latter point: rights do not exist unless they are given or 
"recognized" by positive law. He would not merely abandon the 
field; he recognizes the tension in a democracy.23 He looks to Rawls 
and Dworkin and seems to appreciate their rights analysis - partic-
ularly the latter's view of the due process and equal protection 
clauses as appeals to moral concepts (pp. 239-41), and his fusion of 
constitutional law and moral theory. 
In the end, he quotes a passage from Philip Soper of which I am 
very fond and to which I, too, have referred recently with much 
admiration:24 
Legal doctrine cannot afford the luxury of becoming a professional's 
intellectual pastime. The relevance of moral philosophy to the devel-
opment of norms for governing a society of ordinary people lies in a 
few broad generalizations: Utilitarianism, for example, emphasizes 
that we are part of a social whole; Kantianism reminds us, on the other 
hand, that we are not mere appendages of the social body. And the 
task of judges, to maintain the balance between these poles while the 
philosophers are still out, requires practical reasoning that does not 
yield easily to unified field theories. To look for more is to ignore the 
injunction of one of the first philosophers [Aristotle] to seek "precision 
in each class of things just as far as the nature of the subject admits."25 
This is Frank Coffin's as well as my own pluralism. It leads to a 
22. 520 F.2d 374 (1st Cir. 1975), revd, 427 U.S. 215 (1976). 
23. I may have carried the ''Tension" motif a little far in likening it to poems and a geo-
desic dome that "maintains its shape and stasis by a complex of forces pulling against each 
other." Oakes, The Role of Courts in Government Today, 14 AKRON L. REV. 175, 186 (1980) 
(Whittemore Lecture) (quoting J. JEROME, THE POET AND THE POEM (1974)). Judge Coffin 
speaks of a "coiled spring." 
24. See Oakes, Property Rights in Constitutional Analysis Today, 56 U. WASH. L. REV, 583, 
587 n.21 (1981). See also Oakes, supra note 18, at 924 n.81. 
25. Soper, On the Relevance of Philosophy to Law: Reflections on Ackerman's Private Prop-
erty and the Constitution, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 44, 64 (1979) (quoting ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHE• 
AN ETHICS 1094b (W. Ross trans. 1925)). 
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belief in the measurable movement of dispute resolution out of the 
courts, in extra- or sub-judicial systems within institutions,26 in the 
assumption that the people should become more self-disciplined -
all under an umbrella of both utilitarianism and heightened sensitiv-
ity to individual rights. The "workability factor" must be taken into 
account.27 Judges are now "inescapably" part of the social process, 
and must be aware of its crosscurrents and complexities as they work 
from day to day and case to case. 
Judge Coffin's final point is another reference to accountability, 
not in the narrow sense of the judge's being answerable, much less 
being demeaned, but in the broader sense of deeper and informed 
public participation leading to higher standards and expectations 
with greater respect. A judge's "most elusive mission" (p. 249) is 
"that of safeguarding individual rights in a majoritarian society with 
due regard to the legitimate interests of that society." For that mis-
sion, though he would never say so, Frank Coffin's book shows -
even if one did not know the man - that he is eminently qualified. 
26. A. classic example in our own court recently was New York State Assn. for Retarded 
Children v. Carey, 596 F.2d 27 (2d Cir.) (upholding internal structural decision adding staff to 
review panel established to administer institution under consent judgment), cert. denied, 444 
U.S. 836 (1979). 
27. Judge Coffin has written another classic-this time a law review article-on "worka-
bility," which I highly recommended. Justice and Workability: Un Essai, 5 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 567, 571-74 (1971). 
